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THE "RECKONABILITY" OF APPEALS:

THREE COMMENTS ON LLEWELLYN'S DECIDING APPEALS-,
SIR HENRY SLESSER '

J. L. ILsLEY* O
ARTHUR KELLY**

-

In Deciding Appeals, the late Professor Karl N. Llewellyn presents
an American realist's account of the "reckonability" of appeZlate
courts' decisions in the United States and an analysis of the various
factors which influence courts in deciding cases.
In response to a request by the editors, Sir Henry Slesser comments
on the applicability of Professor Llewellyn's views to the English ap-

pellate tribunals. Chief Justice Ilsley considers the "reckonability" of
the results of Canadian appeals and mentions several problems of

stare decisis peculiar to Canadian jurisprudence. Mr. Justice Kelly
then gives a personal opinion as to the factors influencing Canadian
judges in deciding appeals.

1. Sir Henry Slesser
Although many books have been written on the subject of the
Judicial Office, few, if any, have been devoted to the consideration
of appeals. It may be of interest at the outset to enquire why the

protection of appeals first arose. In all probability the demand for
review derived from the ancient privilege of the subject to seek
redress from the sovereign; this is peculiarly exhibited in the old

Equity petitions before the practice became formalized.

Similarly,

in the Civil Law of Rome there was an appeal from the judgment of a
criminal court to the "People"- the provocatio, and later, the
Emperor became the final Court of Appeal-"the appeal to Caesar"
of which we read in the Bible.
Sometime one of Her Majesty's Lords Justices of Appeal in England.
* Chief Justice of Nova Scotia.
*
Justice of Appeal, Supreme Court of Ontario.
t The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals. By Karl N. Llewellyn.
Boston: Little Brown and Company 1960. 565 pp.
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The Senate, like the High Court of Parliament-in practice the
House of Lords-is recognized in the Digest as having appellate
jurisdiction and in the Privy Council of the British Commonwealth
we see the Royal Prerogative, exercised on the advice of the Judicial
Committee, functioning as a court of appeal-being of such a prerogative nature its opinions are not bound by previous decisions as
are those of the House of Lords.
The Canon Law recognizes appeals to the Roman Papal Consistory, and political as well as legal considerations on the respective
jurisdiction of Princes and Pontiffs are shown in the English legislation
of Provisors and Praemunire. Attempts to limit the authority of
the Supreme Court of the United States may perhaps fall into the
same category.
The actual term "appeal" is rarely found in the British system
before the passing of the Judicature Acts of the seventies. Before
that time the Common Law appeals usually arose through consideration of the Record by "Writ of Error", to be heard in the Exchequer
Chamber. In Chancery it was by way of, "re-hearing" and in the
United States both methods obtained.
The question of error on the face of the Record necessarily limit
the jurisdiction of the Court-the difference in practice in England,
where all Civil Appeals are now by way of re-hearing, distinguishes
the practice in England from much of the procedural limitations still
obtaining in the United States. But beyond this, the acknowledged
power of the Supreme Court to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional and its authority to decide between conflicting claims of Federal
and State Law have no counterpart in the United Kingdom, where
the sovereignty of Parliament is absolute. In these circumstances
the opinion of a Lord Justice or Law Lord on United States appellate
problems can only be advanced with very considerable diffidence.
Yet this being conceded, there are many observations in this work
which are of such general application that they call for comment. It
is surprising for an Englishman to read that there is so much disquiet in legal circles, and even among the public at large, about the
performance of the appellate courts: in England criticisms of the
Judiciary are confined, for the most part, to the Voluntary Magistracy
and the Jury system.
It has been pointed out by Pollock and others that lawyers, in
advising their clients, must assume a certain predictability, based
for the most part on the consideration of decided cases. It would
appear from the author that the chief criticism of the United States'
Bar is that many of the decisions of the Judges are no longer what
he calls "reckonable"; that is that many appeals are decided by
judges who do not follow precedent sufficiently but "decide as they
please".
How far this anxiety is justifled-Llewellyn seems to think that
it is deep-rooted-it is difficult to say, certainly there are not wanting
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American jurists who seem almost to welcome it. Thus Frank in his
Law and the Modern Mind believes that "a judge after brooding
over the case, waits a 'hunch', deciding the case by feeling rather
than by reason and afterwards seeks a reason for it".
Hutcheson, a judge, and others write to the same effect; it is a
view much influenced by Behaviourisn, Pragmatism and Applied
Psychology; an assumption almost unknown in the United Kingdom,
where, so far as I know, a full confidence in judicial rationality still
exists.
This work may be regarded as an attempt to destroy this subjective heresy. The object of the author is one which every British
lawyer will appreciate: Pragmatism has made its influence felt in
England, but so far has not corrupted judicial principles to any
serious extent. It has been otherwise in the United States-"they
can it up as they want to and then write it up to suit" became a
decided opinion, we are told, of many law schools there. "A Freudian
interpretation of judicial opinions broke upon the little world of legal
scholarship", and again, "the danger to-day is that an older generation
of the Bar may be losing all confidence in the steadiness of our
courts in their work and that the younger ones may lose confidence
in the law itself."
There is more apprehension to the like effect, but we may turn
to the constructive attempt of Professor Llewellyn to restore the
integrity of the law with appreciation, and in particular, note his
plea for the revival of the guiding principles to be derived from
precedents.
An excursus, as he calls it, on certainty, predictability and
"reckonability" endeavours to clear the way: as to the first, he is at
pains to declare that juridical certainty can never be absolute-it is
a question of degree, varying from pure chance-this surely could
apply only to a jury-to the "experienced guess of the skilled counsel".
The "reckonability" in appropriate cases should at least be equivalent
to a "good business risk"; neither absolute certainty nor complete
uncertainty can be accepted in any system worthy of the name of
Law.

He cites elements which obtain in appellate courts having "a
steadying effect". The first is that of personnel-"the law-conditioned
officials." "The judges" says Llewellyn, "are not mere Americans,
they have been "Law-conditioned." But although they think as
lawyers, they do not always act as such, but specifically as American
ones. Nowhere, it is to be observed, does he discuss the effect of the
very varying means by which lawyers in the United States are
nominated or elected to the Bench, methods which differ very notably
from the British system of promoting barristers of standing and
excluding all other practitioners. He notes the great authority of the
Supreme Court, not only over people and governments (a power
implicit in the Constitution of the United States), but also over "the
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rules and manner of our laws". There has developed in various ways;
sometimes deliberately learned and sometimes subconsciously assumed,
a doctrine which in time formulates precedent-a process called by
the author "leeways", and this not merely in following decisions,
but in procedural thinking as well.
Where there is no room for doubt, the legal doctrine, established
over long years, will decide the issue. In novel cases, a departure from
precedent may be necessary, but even in such a contingency the
author emphasises the importance of Prudence-"conscience and
good motive restrain the judge from abuse of his freedom of
adjudication; in every instance the judgment must fit into the 'flavour'
of the law-neither wild men nor fools must dominate the Bench,
and the public and the Bar must feel a confidence which only good
judges can produce."
Above all, there must be "a deep felt need, duty and responsibility
for bringing out a result which is just". The meaning of justice
will vary from court to court, the older idea that there is only one
answer to an appeal, he maintains has had unhappy results, though
in very many cases, as Cardozo has declared, the answer is almost
certain. He estimated the predetermined at nine-tenths of the suits,
the author says eight out of ten.
Although there is a tendency to reformulate ill-drawn issues
where necessary, as a rule they have been settled by trained lawyers,
and, therefore, the court is reluctant on appeal to stray beyond the
Record. Unlike the British practice, argument is addressed in writing
as well as orally. The system of "briefs", placed before the court, often
discloses inadequate presentation unlikely to survive oral interrogation by the Bench, and this marked disparity in the competence of the
multitudinous American Bar is most obvious in its written work. In
this respect there is much to be said for the British method of separating the very limited number of barristers, most of their leaders being
known to the Bench, from the far greater number of solicitors, for
here it is recognized more fully that in the United States that the
work of advocacy and the preparation of pleadings for trial is a very
specialized one.
As to the specialization of the judges themselves, the author
points out that the general approach is influenced by the age in which
they live-I have ventured to discuss this matter in my London
University lecture on the "Art of Judgment"-Llewellyn, speaking of
Mansfield, Marshall and their disciples speaks of the "Grand Style".
This, he says relates to the manner of "doing the job with craftsmanship in a functioning harmonization of vision with tradition, of
continuity with growth, of machinery with purpose, of measure with
need".

This pre-pragmatic responsible habit is called by Roscoe Pound
"our classic period"; a time creative yet based on principle. According
to the author it lasted in the United States down to 1860. He calls
it the "authordox ideology, the formative time."
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There followed the era of "obsolete doctrine", the over-pedantic
application of the classic idea, not uninfluenced by social prejudice,
producing such injustices as the notorious injunctions against progressive labour and social legislation.
A revulsion from this ultra-academic attitude, in order to accept
modern notions of communal equity produced an over violent practicality of political order resulting in the decay of case-precedent-"a
random irregularity jumped legal fences". He sums up this departure
from earlier tradition by declaring that "a change of style had begun".
"From now onwards the laws passed by Congress are rarely
resisted on judicial grounds but, as regards the Bar, there has grown
up a feeling of uncertainty-most of them are in the dark-they still
use methods of authordox ideology though they do not study recent
development and so are confused." In the manner which the author
has deplored in his earlier chapters, the judges tend to decree what
seems to them right in particular cases-Llewellyn calls it "a halfbaked technique and one which strains towards discontinuity and
unwisdom".
The right solution, he maintains, is to search for "the recurrent
problem-situation of which the instant case is typical". This process
compels the court to seek some guiding rule, to consider the heritage
of the doctrine to be applied; while pedantic formulation is to be
avoided, so also is a wholly empirical, pragmatic approach.
It is pleasing to note, however, that whatever the tendencies
of some appellate courts to depart unduly from principle, the author
speaks highly of their character. "Despite all mistakes and passions
of to-day, they have either maintained or speedily regained a standing
with the lay public hardly rivalled by any scattered, unorganized
aggregation of equivalent nature in all recorded history." The only
period he cites to the contrary concerns "government by injunction"
in the age of Theodore Roosevelt, which resulted in a movement for
the recall of many judges.
In most cases "the office shapes the man". The saying that the
judges decide as they like, whether prompted by prejudice, psychology
or the bitterness of disappointed litigants, is a foolish exaggeration.
Discretion is one thing, judicial idiosyncrasy another. Professor
Llewellyn calls upon university teachers "to unmask the pretenders".
The sophistical sceptic is not so easily dealt with.
This type of doubter would argue that the court (often of five
to seven individuals) would decide not any law, but that which they
might conjure up to meet the exigencies of the case, thus the only
safe practice, this conservative would allow, is to follow ancient
practice--all else is guess-work or personal prejudice masquerading
as principle.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 2:393

But is there not a via media, our author asks? He points out that
since 1930 there has arisen a more critical study of the earlier opinions
of the court. "Fear of Socialism" wrote Holmes "affected many earlier
decisions and must be interpreted in terms of then existing issues;
History cannot be ignored. The adjudication must take place in the
soil of common knowledge, practice and common sense." In his
colloquial language the author speaks of "isness and oughtness" to
cover these various requirements.
Yet, though both influences present themselves to the judge, the
present and past considerations, one decision only can be reached
in his judgment. There are cases where the rule is so firmly
established that it cannot be disturbed, even though doubts as to its
soundness may exist. Next, the theory underlying the rule may be
accepted, but it may allow a certain elasticity in application, or it may
be that the previous interpretation may be reconsidered and qualification admitted. Finally, there are cases where previous decisions are
inapplicable and do not bind.
In this last case "a new start must be made from old material"
or in the last resort there may be "a deliberate and important redirection of the rule". What, however, he does emphatically condemn
is an evasion of precedent under the excuse that the facts are different
when they are really parallel-to ignore an established rule altogether
is even worse.
There remains the "fresh start from old material"-a requirement
which is often produced by legislation or new evidential matter
hitherto unexplored, as in the case of newly discovered scientific
knowledge. Judicial reason may be carried into new territory and
may have to be invoked not only in the "key cases" that are decisive,
but also in the creative effect of day to day decisions which develop
an ever-growing corpus and modification of extant law.
Nevertheless, to appreciate the general tendency of the times,
there is no better criterion than is obtainable from the study of the
Supreme Courts. Considering them as a whole, the author notes a
general reversion to the methods of a hundred years ago; what he
calls the "Grand Style". Present throughout again is not only the
pressure of authority, "but also open willingness to canvass a situation
present in unusual degree". The practice of referring to the opinions
of distinguished judges by name has revived. He cites many examples
and appears optimistic as to the recovery of sound adjudication.
The revival of the sense of "craft" in judicial work is recognized"a significant body of working knowledge, transmissible in practices
which can be learned, illiciting ideals, pride and responsibility"-appellate judgment is a part of the craft of "government by law" and
in the United States, the judges have again recovered their rightful
status.
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The disquiet shown by the Bar and commentators, which is

acknowledged by Professor Llewellyn, albeit, as he thinks, superficially, and the jeopardy of jurisprudence when it is no longer regarded as an art, is implicit in this book, and is understandable when
the more hopeful recent developments are ignored. As has been suggested, I cannot detect any like apprehension in Britain; what is here
more alarming is the constant supersession of the courts by ministerial
tribunals which often are required by statute to perform, in addition
to their proper administrative duties, quasi-judicial functions, for
which they are often untrained. This is the result of Britain being a
semi-collectivist society, in contrast with the United States. For this
reason a British lawyer or judge is not well-fitted to assess the gravity
of Professor Llewellyn's assertions and fears. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe how the Common Law of both countries has
differently developed, raising very divergent problems, perils, and

remedies.
"This volume" writes the author "gathers together the substance
of four earlier sets of lectures"; they culminated in an invitation to
lecture in Leipzig on American Case Law, a system, like the British,
very different from that practiced by European countries under the
influence of Roman Law. There was a need "to explain to the lawyers
of completely different background and training, not what our case
results were, but how we got them". Although the United States has
developed in a manner very different from that of the British system,
yet, in his endeavour to expound American principles to Germans, he
used arguments which may usefully be studied in this country,
threatened as we are, by the influence of Roman Law if Britain joins

the European Community.
Llewellyn quotes "without change" and therefore, it is assumed
with present approval, what he told law students in 1930; an address
which summarized his whole argument as regards responsible criticism

of judicial practice:
'vhatever has gone, the law is yet left to you. Left to you as the fixed
sure order of society. Left to you as that which controls the judges,
which clothes the judge with a certain majesty even while and indeed
because it does control him, which lifts him and his work to a level he
could not attain alone. Left to you as the million of sonorous sentences
that in a million cases expound the inescapable logic under which the
judgment is dictated by the law. And we? These fabrics we seize and
tear as idle cobweb. These mirrors of old dear-held truth, we shatter.
The law itself dissolves before our acids. Right and justice come to
figure as pretty names for very human acts done on often the less
human of human motivations. I have said before that this tendency of
our teaching has caused me worry, in its aspect as developing the
technician at the cost of the whole man. It gives me double pause in
this connection-in its effect on young men already disillusioned beyond
the portion of young men.
In the first place, iconoclasm can be a sport as well as a condition; even
when not so viewed, the fact of smashing calls disproportionate attention
to the broken pieces; revolt is seldom characterized by balanced judgment. We of the teaching world are still as full of our discovery as
once was tortured Galileo: move, move it does, the law. And if, to make
you see the movement, we must shout down the pious words with which
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courts have pretended that no change occurred-then we must shout,
shout disbelief. We must blaspheme the legal oracles. Well, then, we
do. We strip the trappings, verbal and other, off the courts. We turn
the spotlight on the places where the tinsel gaps, where you see cheap
cotton, or see sweaty skin beneath. These are the crucial cases or the
argument-but are they type or caricature of the run of legal work?
The tendency of the teaching has its worry. To get across a vital lesson
one must risk distortion.
The sight of falling tinsel, too, may seem to argue falling dignity. It
is a vicious seeming. It is as false as the ill supersition that the tinsel
is the measure of a man. Rather are measures and dignity of man and
office to be found when folderol and claptrap are stripped off; when, free
of pomp, on the record and the naked fact, they stand four-square. So
must we strip the courts; so must we test them. The stripping is a
tribute. An institution we could not honor naked we should not dare
to strip. You are to remember, too, the dignity and measure of a critic:
they lie in that he sees the record whole; in that his judgment and his
tone of judgment weigh the accomplishment against the difficulty, weigh
partial flaws against the fullness of what has been done. Seen thus,
judged as you would judge a man upon his life, law and the courts stand
up. It may be that as your knowledge grows your disillusion will be
tinged with wonder, as has mine. The heaped-up cases through the
centuries; the heaped-up wisdom. As I watch the succession of the
cases-moving, rising, taking form eternally-as I see the sweep of them
entire, I find old formulae of tribute rising to my tongue: 'the full
perfection of right reason'! The closer I can come to seeing law whole,
the more nearly do I, of the skeptic's clan, find myself bordering on
mysticism. There is such balance and such beauty and skill beyond the
little powers of the individual judges. It is the little powers you are
watching in the individual cases. Loose logic, or even bad, lies open to
your sight; the wisdom of the holding when set in the rhythm of the
pillaring years-to see that is not so simple.
Single case after single case there is, that irks me, that I would pluck
out. Yet take them: what is it that offends? Here is the case whose
reasoning is wretched, grotesque. Yet how of the outcome, on the factswas it not rather sane? Systematizing conclusions is after all the business of the second or the fourth case in a series, not of the first; our law
has grown by trial, and then correction. This same court which has
mangled the authorities; may it not when the need comes mangle this
one, too-and reach another sane result? Here is another case; It seems
outrageous. Yet stay-why so outrageous? Because it cuts across my
opinions. But how many are there here beside the judges who do not
square with my opinions? These judges may judge social values differently from me: no sign that they are fools; opinions differ. A third
type of case: a technical problem; a crazy decision; the court has utterly
failed to see the point. Look to the counsel: has a Root misled the
court? Yet even so, that would be but an excuse. But now the question
rises of perspective. How often does it happen, in the large? How often,
too, in the light of the maze of matters that in a year are brought before
a court? Criticize such a decision, attack it-yes; attack It with all vigor
that is in us, as we attack the others that we doubt. The courts need such
attacks. The court requires attack on its decision, because the court
is strong. The law requires detailed surgery, the law can stand up
under major operations, because the law is strong to stand the shock.
Four-square it stands, upon its whole performance. He who helps cut out
error gives it strength."I
I cite this homily to law students as an example of the author's

outlook, expressed in a boisterous phraseology, so unlike the austere
utterances of British jurists, even when addressed to students.
i Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (New York, Oceana Publications, 1951)
at pp. 124-126.
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But there is one further comment which I would make; the
absence throughout the whole work of any fundamental enquiry into
the nature of that Justice which he seeks to elucidate. No mention
is made of that Natural Law recognized by the Constitution of the
United States and by many of the earlier judges. There is a marked
absence of any basic consideration of those assumptions which
animated Holt and Mansfield whom he so much admires: the whole
work, like so much American commentary, is over-pragmatical-concerned only with the actual working of the courts. That there are
underlying canons of interpretation; historic, logical, sociological,
comparative or ethical, nowhere are recognized. There is no reference
to the learning to be found in the great system of Roman Jurisprudence and, a marked absence of anything approaching an international
outlook, which is the more surprising as the work is chiefly interested
in commercial problems, of all branches of law most dependent upon
international jurisprudence.
It may be said that Professor Llewellyn deliberately confined
himself to the activities or "reckonability" of the United States'
appellate courts, but the considerations which I have mentioned have
always figured prominently in the opinions of the Supreme Court,
more particularly in the commentaries of their most illustrious judges,
and cannot be ignored.

2. J. L. Ilsley
The first words of Llewellyn's The Common Law Tradition:Deciding Appeals, under the heading "The Why and What of This Book",
are as follows:
This book starts with the fact that the bar is bothered about our appellate
courts-not the much discussed Supreme Court alone, but our appellate
courts in general. The bar is so much bothered about these courts that
we face a crisis in confidence which packs danger.

A little later (p. 4) the author says:
You cannot listen to the dirges of lawyers about the death of stare decisis
(of the nature of which lovely institution the dirge-chanters have little
inkling) without realizing that one great group at the bar are close to
losing their faith. You cannot listen to the cynicism about the appellate
courts that is stock conversation of the semi- or moderately successful
lawyer in his middle years without realizing that his success transmutes
into gall even as it comes to him. You cannot watch generations of law
students assume, two thirds of them, as of course and despite all your
effort, that if the outcome of an appeal is not foredoomed in logic it
therefore is the product of uncontrolled will which is as good as wayward, without realizing that our machinery for communicating the facts
of life about the work of our central and vital symbol of The Law, the
appellate courts, has become frighteningly deficient.
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The author's thesis, if one can reduce a book of nearly 550 large
pages to a thesis, is that the work of the appellate courts all over the
United States is "reckonable". It is, he says (p. 4):
reckonable first, and on a relative scale, far beyond what any sane man
has any business expecting from a machinery devoted to settling disputes
self-selected for their toughness. It is reckonable second, and on an
absolute scale, quite sufficiently for skilled craftsmen to make usable
and valuable judgments about likelihoods, and quite sufficiently to
render the handling of an appeal a fitting subject for effective and
satisfying craftsmanship.

The author is concerned for the restoration of respect for judicial
appellate action. It would appear from his book that there was a considerable loss of respect in the '20's and '30's of the present century
for he says (p. 56):
And one has ever to bear in mind as among the possibilities of deflection
the type of thing which infatuated the cynics of the '20's and '30's: If
the opinion is a justification, nay, a 'mere rationalization' of a decision
already reached, a justification intended 'only' for public consumption, its
'light' can be contrived delusion. Vital factors may go unmentioned;
pseudo factors may be put forward; emphasis and weighing of factors
may be hugely skewed; any statements of policy may be not for revelation but merely for consumption; the very alleged statement of 'the
facts' may be only a lawyer's argumentative arranged selection, omission,
emphasis, distortion, all flavored to make the result tolerable or
toothsome.

The author elsewhere indicates that he is not impressed by those whom
he calls "the jejune or jaundiced jibers at the courts" (p. 56).
To a Canadian judge it may come as a surprise that there is in
the bar of the United States any substantial number of "jibers at
the courts". I am not aware that there is any substantial number of
such in Canada. However, to understand the situation in the United
States, one must know something about the "school" of American
Realists, so-called. On pages 45 to 49 of Precedent in English Law'
by Cross the author discusses "the opinion of a body of American
writers, among whom the late Judge Jerome Frank was prominent,
and who are often spoken of as realists".2 Cross's discussion is centred
on his consideration of the distinction between ratio decidendi and
obiter dictum and the following passage is worth quoting:
Before proceeding any further with our endeavour to elucidate the distinction between ratio decidendi and obiter dictum, account must be taken
of an opinion held in some quarters that any attempt of this nature Is
nothing more than a wild goose chase. This is, in substance, the opinion
of a body of American writers, among whom the late Judge Jerome
Frank was prominent, and who are often spoken of as realists. By way
of contrast -with the stress placed by orthodox English judicial theory
on the freedom of the judge who decides the case in the matter of Its
ratio decidendi, they emphasize the liberty which a later judge enjoys
of disregarding what his predecessors said in the cases cited to him. The
realists maintain that it is a mistake to pay too great a regard to the
vocal as opposed to the non-vocal behaviour of judges. 'Don't worry
so much about what the courts say, consider what they do', is one of the
chief cries of this schooLS
i Cross, Precedent in Englisk Law (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1961)
at p3. 4549.
p. 45.
3 Ibid.,
!bid., p.
45.
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The late Judge Jerome Frank wrote a book published in 1930
called Law and the Modern Mind.4 In this book he indicates, among
other things, that much of the uncertainty of law is not an unfortunate
accident but is of immense social value. His book was reviewed by
Henry Rottschaefer of the University of Minnesota Law School in
1931, 5 and, although space does not permit a summary of even the

review, let alone the book, it may be briefly stated that Frank in
his book says in effect that it is a "basic myth" that law can be, is,
or ought to be certain, in the sense of predictable; that an important
foundation of this myth is the emotional desire for certainty in a
world of chance and uncertainty, a desire which has its psychological
origins in early childhood; that the law becomes a father-substitute;
that the judging process starts not from premises but from conclusions
and works back, within limits, to suitable premises; that the way in
which judges get their "hunches" is the key to the judicial process;
and that in judicial law-making such factors as the social, political
and economic beliefs of judges, and their subconscious biases, are of
the utmost importance. Rottschaefer considers that the most glaring
instance of overemphasis in the book is Frank's assumption that
because complete predictability is impossible, therefore no practical
degree of it is either realizable or desirable, and that here overemphasis has resulted in defective analysis. Professor Llewellyn
does not seem to be much impressed with Frank's theories, for he
says, obviously referring to them, the following (p. 198):

I am not maundering about 'certainty' and womb-yearning or about law
'the solid' as a father-substitute or similar unnecessary tripe. I am dealing
with the sound and right feeling of the American lawyer and the
American law-consumer that the work of his appellate tribunals has no
business to be hopelessly unreckonable.

Despite his lack of enthusiasm for the views of the American
Realists, or some of them, Professor Llewellyn himself, in Appendix
B to his book, says (p. 509):
I put this book forward both in its plan and on its descriptive side as a
solid and unmistakable product and embodiment of American Legal
Realism. I should indeed like to use the book to shame either old
critics of the movement or later ones.

and the following (p. 512):
I now put forward, explicitly as a proper product and exhibit of real
realism this book.
Here you can meet not the goblin, but the horse.

The author says in Appendix B that the book has been more than
thirty years in the making and undertakes to combine solidity and
roundedness and balance. It must be prepared to meet the reader or
critic on those terms.
A Canadian judge is handicapped in dealing with a book on
American Realism, whether in its extreme or modified forms. The
4 Frank, Law and the Modern Mind. (Stevens & Sons, Ltd.).
5 44 Harv. L. Rev. 481.
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judicial process with which he is acquainted is obviously very different
from that employed in many if not most courts in the United States.
Professor Llewellyn's book might appropriately be caed "The Nature
of the Judicial Process in the Appeal Courts of the United States."
The Nature of the Judicial Process6 was the title of a volume of
addresses delivered before the Law School of Yale University by Judge
Cardozo, as he then was, in 1921, and in these addresses it seems
to me that Cardozo comes much closer than Professor Llewellyn to
describing the judicial process as we know it in Canada. These
addresses will be referred to later but it may be noted at once that
Cardozo recognizes that the rule of adherence to precedent is applied
with less rigidity in the United States than in England, and, he
thought (in 1921), with a rigidity that was diminishing in the United
States. In an article published in the July, 1962, issue of the Law
Quarterly Review,7 Delmar Karlen compares appeals in England
with those in the United States. The author says:
In the United States, an appellate court is free to overrule its own
previous decisions. In England, it is not, and corrective action must
come through legislation. In this sense, the United States seems to have
a far less rigid doctrine of precedent than England.S
I think also that it is true to say that the United States seems
to have a far less rigid doctrine of precedent than Canada, at least
the common law provinces of Canada.
A striking feature of Professor Llewellyn's book is his submission
that for a very long period the appellate courts both of England and
of the United States applied a method of deciding appeals which he
describes as the Grand Style and which he attributes to what he calls
the common law tradition. His use of the word "style" in Grand Style
refers "not to literary quality or tone, but to the manner of doing the
job, to the way of craftsmanship in office, to a functioning harmonization of vision with tradition, of continuity with growth, of machinery
with purpose, of measure with need". His conception of the Grand
Style may be gathered from the following passages. He says (p. 5):
We shall observe, however, that the huge unnoticed or forgotten or
ignored correct range for action which our American system has afforded
to our appellate courts from the beginnings of the nation in no way produces an undue unreckonability of results. We shall see that the most
vital element in reckonability and stability is the courts' constant use,
in application of doctrine, and also in choosing among the branching
doctrinal possibilities, of the best sense and wisdom It can muster-but
always in terms of those same traditions of the work which we have
seen as 'steadying factors.' We shall demonstrate that sense Is thus
used not occasionally but constantly, not in great cases only but in the
mine-run of cases as well; and we shall demonstrate also that sense and
wisdom are thus used daily not only in application of doctrine or in
choice among competing rules but in an area by no means so frequently
observed, to wit, in the on-going, careful readjustment of doctrine to
needs by way of overt recourse to the sense which ought to control in
6 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1921).
7 Appeals in England and The United States, 78 Law Q. Rev. 371.
8 !bid, at p. 384.
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the given type-situation. We shall show that this is not novel, but is
old, is not occasional, but is standard, is not unsettling, but is stabilizing.
It is, in fact, the manner of appellate judicial work which prevailed in
this country from Jefferson's administration up roughly until Grant's.
Pound has called it the manner of 'our classic period': I call it
our Grand Style.

and (p. 36):
The type-thinking of the time [of the Grand Style] is to view precedents
as welcome and very persuasive, but it is to test a precedent almost
always against three types of reason before it is accepted. The reputation of the opinion-writing judge counts heavily . . . . Secondly,
'principle' is consulted to check up on precedent, and . . . 'principle'
means no mere verbal tool for bringing large-scale order into the rules,
it means a broad generalization which must yield patent sense as well
as order, if it is to be 'principle'. Finally, 'policy', in terms of prospective
consequences of the rule under consideration, comes in for explicit
examination by reason in a further test of both the rule in question and
its application. The tone and mark consist in an as-of-courseness in the
constant questing for better and best law to guide the future, but the
better and best law is to be built on and out of what the past can offer;
the quest consists in a constant re-examination and reworking of a
heritage, that the heritage may yield not only solidity but comfort for
the new day and for the morrow.

The author says that there was an incursion later (as or after
the Grand Style faded out) of "a way of work in which the appellate
judges sought to do their deciding without reference to much except
the rules, sought to eliminate the impact of sense, as an intrusion, and
sought to write their opinions as if wisdom (in contrast to logic)
were hardly a decent attribute of a responsible appellate court". The
author calls "that way of work the Formal Style; its image is with us
still, distorting the common perception both of what our appellate
courts are doing and of what they ought to do. The prevalence still
of that unhappy image is indeed the major cause of the crisis in
confidence" (p. 5).
The author indicates that the Formal Style came into use gradually in or near the '80's and began to subside about 1920 and that there
is now, the author hopes and believes, a more or less complete return
to something like the Grand Style in many of the appellate courts.
He believes, as appears from some of the foregoing quotations, that
this return to the Grand Style makes for an increase in the "reckonability" of the results of appeals.
The book has a chapter on what the author calls the major
steadying factors in our appellate courts, namely: "Law-conditioned
Officials; Legal Doctrine; Known Doctrinal Techniques; Responsibility
for Justice; The Tradition of One Single Right Answer; An Opinion
of the Court; A Frozen Record from Below; Issues Limited, Sharpened, Phrased; Adversary Argument by Counsel; Group Decision;
Judicial Security and Honesty; A Known Bench; The General PeriodStyle and Its Promise; and Professional Judicial Office" (p. 19).
Another chapter called "The Leeways of Precedent" shows the large
number of techniques employed by courts in treating precedents.
The author believes that what he calls horse sense and type-situation
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should have a large part in the decision of appeals, horse sense being
defined, not as the sense of a horse, or ordinary sense, but as "that
extraordinary and uncommon kind of experience, sense, and intuition
which was characteristic of an old-fashioned skilled horse trader in
his dealings either with horses or with other horse traders" (p. 201).
The book discusses appellate judging as a "craft of law" and later
contains a long, and, to a judge, most interesting, chapter entitied
"Conclusions for Courts".
When I read the book the first time, I found much of it hard
going; when I read it the second time, I found most of it of absorbing
interest. But for a Canadian judge, at least in the common law
provinces, I think there are more helpful works, and among works
I include contributions to such publications as the Canadian Bar
Review on precedent in our courts and stare decisis, subjects which
are, I think, of special difficulty to Canadian lawyers and judges, and
which have a vital bearing on the subject-matter of Professor
Llewellyn's book.
Among the American works (by "American" I mean United
States') that I class as particularly helpful, I would give prominent
place to the brilliant addresses of Cardozo in the series already
mentioned, The Nature of the Judicial Process.9 One can hardly
resist the temptation to quote extensively from these addresses but
space does not permit me to do more than make passing reference.
Allowing for the fact that the rule of adherence to precedent is
applied with less rigidity in the United States than in England (or,
as I believe, in Canada), the picture that emerges from Cardozo's
addresses of the degree of predictability of the results of appeals in
American courts is fairly clear.
Among English works that I regard as particularly helpful, I
would place high the book Precedent in English Law' 0 by Cross, to
which I have referred. This book, published in 1961, gives a clear,
readable and thorough description of the English doctrine of precedent. Cross translates stare decisis as meaning "keep to what has been
decided previously". He says that while judicial precedent has some
persuasive effect almost everywhere because the maxim stare decisis
is one of universal application, the peculiar feature of the English
doctrine of precedent is its strongly coercive nature. He proceeds to
say:
English judges are sometimes obliged to follow a previous case although
they have what would otherwise be good reasons for not doing so. In
other words, a precedent may be binding and not merely persuasive in
England because stare decisis is, generally speaking, a hard-and-fast
rule in this country. It is a great deal more than a mere maxim of
judicial conduct to be followed if other things are more or less equal.11
9
Supra, footnote 6.
'oSupra, footnote 1.

1 bid, at p. 4.
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The general rule in England is that every court is bound to follow
any case decided by a court above it in the hierarchy, and appellate
courts are bound by their previous decisions. Cross himself, after
considering the rule that the House of Lords is bound by its previous
decisions, gives it as his opinion that the House of Lords should have
power to overrule its past decisions and that there is an absence of
any convincing argument to the contrary. He says, and he is not
speaking only of the House of Lords, that it is more difficult to get
rid of an awkward decision in England than almost anywhere else
in the world.
The result of this rigid system would appear to be that undue
ingenuity is sometimes, if not often, used by appellate courts in distinguishing previous decisions. As every lawyer knows, a decision
contains either expressly or by implication a ratio decidendi (or
more than one) and that it may also include obiter dicta, which Cross
refers to as statements by the way. It is only the ratio decidendi that
is binding and it is often difficult to determine what was ratio and
what was merely dictum. A very narrow description of the ratio
may enable the court in the later case to distinguish, somewhat
surprisingly, the earlier case. However, I think all would agree that
it is not legitimate for a court to choose as a distinction any but a
reasonable one, that is, a distinction which a lawyer might reasonably
consider to be relevant, having regard to the existing state of the law.
So far as my experience goes, and I have certainly not made a
study of the subject, Canadian judges have been conscientious and
scrupulous in their determination of true rationesand true distinctions.
I call attention to what Professor Llewellyn says (p. 287):
So that we come back to the ancient wisdom: 'a distinction without a
difference' is a stench, and there is no reason why the difference should
not be sweetly blazoned on the page.
The exceptions to the rule of stare decisis are set out as follows
by Cross:
Even if a court would be bound by a particular decision in the ordinary
way, that decision need not be followed (i) if it conflicts with a previous
decision of the same court, (ii) if it has been impliedly overruled by a
subsequent decision of a higher court, (iii) if it was decided per incuriam,
(iv) (perhaps) if it conflicts with a previous decision of a higher court,
notwithstanding the fact that that decision was considered by the court
which decided the case in question which case accordingly cannot be said
to have been decided per incuriam, and (v) (perhaps) if the decision
turned on grounds of public policy with regard to which there has been
a change of view through causes independent of the action of the courts.12
However, there are many refinements and qualifications of both
the rules relating to stare decisis and the exceptions. Cross points
out the impropriety, which I take to be the legal impropriety, of too
rigid an application of stare decisis and that "analogical reasoning
may occasionally become too narrow and thus degenerate into
conceptualism".
121bid, at pp. 144-145.
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After all is considered, it seems to me that the English system
of close adherence to precedent must result in much more certainty,
predictability and "reckonability" in appeals in the English courts
than the American system does in the American courts.
13
I now come to the Canadian material to which I have referred.
I think it is generally true to say that the problems that give concern
to Canadian judges are somewhat different in character from those
dealt with by Professor Llewellyn. The following questions occasionally if not, frequently, arise in a Canadian judge's mind:

(a) Is the Supreme Court of Canada bound to follow its own
previous decisions? My impression is that the Supreme Court of
Canada has not given any express answer to this question, and that
implications from individual appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada
are, at least arguably, conflicting.
(b) Are any courts in Canada bound by the decisions of any
English courts, including the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
rendered before the Judicial Committee ceased to have ultimate
appellate jurisdiction for Canada? And, if so, what Canadian Courts
and what English courts?
(c) Is a provincial court of appeal bound to follow the previous
decisions of the court of appeal of the same province? If the English
case of Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co.,14 is to be followed, the answer
probably should be in the affirmative (with the exceptions mentioned
in that case). But is the provincial court of appeal bound to follow
as a precedent Young v. Bristol, or, for that matter, any decision
of an English court, even though rendered before the Judicial Committee ceased to have ultimate appellate jurisdiction for Canada?
(d) Is a provincial court of appeal bound to follow decisions of
the Supreme Court of Canada rendered before it acquired exclusive
ultimate appellate jurisdiction for Canada in cases not appealed to the
Judicial Committee? And if so, with what, if any, exceptions or
qualifications?
I am assuming, perhaps too hastily, that Canadian courts are not
bound to follow decisions of any English courts rendered after the
Judicial Committee ceased to have ultimate appellate jurisdiction for
Canada; that all Canadian courts lower than the Supreme Court of
Canada are bound to follow all relevant decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada rendered since it acquired exclusive ultimate appellate jurisdiction for Canada; that no provincial court of appeal is
bound by the previous decisions of the appeal courts of other provinces; and that a judge of first instance is not bound by a previous
decision of a judge of co-ordinate jurisdiction.
13A list of contributions to the Canadian Bar Review on the subject of
stare decisis may be found at (1962), 40 Can. Bar Rev. 149.
14 [1944] K.B. 718, [1946] A.C. 163.
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In what I have said relating to the problems of Canadian courts
as such I have raised no question as to the persuasive, as distinct
from the binding, authority of the decisions of any courts.
Questions (a), (b), (c) and (d) do not constitute an exhaustive
list but this is the class of questions definitive answers to which
would go some distance towards increasing in Canada what Professor Llewellyn calls the "reckonability of results" of appeals.

3. Arthur Kelly
The role of judge, the arbiter of controversies between subjects,
was from the earliest days of man's association with other men in
some form of society an essential factor in maintaining order. In
fact, unless man was prepared to subscribe to the right of every
individual to impose his will by force on everyone he was able to
subdue physically, the power to make and enforce decisions was a
necessary ingredient for the survival of society.
Originally the power of judging reposed in the chief, the leader
or the sovereign; the notion of the office of judge, divorced from
the person of the sovereign, that of a professional decider dispensing
the justice of the sovereign, is recent compared with the span of
man's social development: but since its emergence there has grown
up around the office and its performance, customs and traditions
which have taken away from the exercise of the office the arbitrary
nature of the results which characterized its exercise by the sovereign.
As society became more complex, the need for stability in the
rulings of judges increased and the formulation of guide lines became
more desirable to those affected by judicial decisions and more
acceptable to those making them. The extent of the movement is
indicated by the fact that the sovereign in whose person nominally
reposed the power of making, interpreting and applying law, finally
recognized that his power was no longer a despotic one but was
exercisable by virtue of, and in accordance with, the prevailing concept of law.
It is axiomatic to say that, for the proper ordering of human
relationships, man must have assurance that the laws according to
which his conduct will be judged tomorrow will be the same as
the law according to which he decided upon his course of conduct
yesterday. Under the common law this stability has been achieved
by the adherence by judges to the principle that the interpretation
of the law and its application to the facts to be pronounced in any
given cause will not depart from the previous interpretation and
application by a court of co-ordinate or superior jurisdiction.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL[

[VOL. 2:393

The manner of the application of this principle, as well as
achieving stability, has led to the continuous adjustment of the law
to the developing social, economic and political conditions prevailing
at any given time.
It may seem paradoxical to attribute both stability and flexibility
to the fruits of the application of the doctrine of stare decisis, but
it is the great genius of the common law that this two-fold result
has been accomplished. The outcome of cases which have come
before the courts for decision shows how from day to day and year
to year the judges have gone about their work so that it can be
faithfully said that both these principles have been adhered to, with
an overall satisfaction with the decisions resulting. That this result
has been accomplished is a tribute to the everyday work of the
judges in deciding the cases brought before them.
When any exhaustive examination is made of the process of
deciding under the common law and of the persons by whom it is
done, one of the first things to strike the observer is that, unlike
civil law countries, the common law systems have not developed a
separate profession of judges, persons who select a judicial career
rather than a career in the private practice of the profession of law
and who are by a deliberate process of advancement in responsibility,
trained specifically for the offices they will be called upon to fill.
Both here and in the United States, as in other common law jurisdictions, the members of the judiciary are drawn from the ranks
of practising barristers, the only specified qualification generally
being a minimum number of years of practice as a barrister. This
process assumes that no special training is a prerequisite and that
the possession of certain qualities assures that the appointee brings
to the Bench an adequately developed capacity for the craft of
judging.
It is not surprising, therefore, that there is a paucity of texts
touching upon the performance of the judicial function. In fact, even
among judges, there is a dearth of authorship dealing with the
nature of the office and the manner in which it is performed.
Judicial reference to the skill and ability of other judges is to
be found in judgments, but from them it would be hard for an
eager neophyte to piece together any comprehensive treatise for
his own guidance.
There are to be found some writings which are the exposition
of a personal philosophy: among these the best known is Cardozo's
Nature of the Judicial Process. This has a subjective approach and
must be looked upon as a personal credo-albeit that of one of the
great masters of his profession. The unique position it holds is
attested by the fact that for many years it has been read, perhaps
surreptitiously, but at least once following his appointment, by every
English speaking judge on this continent.
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The need of one occupying the office of judge for the attainment
of special techniques seems to speak for itself. Yet one looking for
the means by which consciously the desirable qualities and skills
may be developed will find an almost complete absence of facilities.
Apart from "The Appellate Judges Seminar" conducted annually at
the Law School of New York University under the joint sponsorship
of the Institute for Judicial Administration and West Publishing
Company, it is difficult to find any group with the temerity to suggest
that judges can be taught anything about their craft.
Those who have found merit in Cardozo's essay, and who seek
some exposition from a source external to the Bench, will find much
of assistance in Karl Llewellyn's The Common Law TraditionDeciding Appeals.
The reason given by the author for the writing of this book
perhaps best indicates its nature. Llewellyn, a professor of law at
the University of Chicago, became concerned over the persisting
attitude of successive classes of students that the outcome of cases
heard by the appellate courts in the United States lacked any reasonable degree of predictability and that this lack indicated that the
results were purely arbitrary.
In an effort to determine to what extent the decision of an
appellate court in any given case could be forecast, Llewellyn embarked on a critical study of reported decisions selected at random.
A clinical examination of the written reasons for judgment delivered
in different parts of the United States proceeded as an intellectual
post-mortem on the workings of appellate courts: the conclusions
set out, from an objective point of vantage, a searching analysis of
how courts work in deciding the litigants' causes brought before
them. The book does not attempt to set forth the personal views of
any one or more judges, but it gives the results of an extra-judicial
study of the workings of the courts arrived at from a consideration
of the reasons, embodied in written opinions, attributed by the courts
as the compelling factors leading to the recorded results.
To any counsel advising a client upon the desirability of an
appeal or preparing for an appellate court the argument of his client's
case, this volume is pure gold: to this writer, at least, it provided an
occasion to re-assess his views as to the purpose of the appellate
courts and to sharpen his focus of many of the areas of their work.
It is not the purpose of this article to review Llewellyn's book,
but only to set down some of the ideas which the reading of it has
served to crystallize, ideas which condition the writer's approach to
the business of setting down in written form the reasons which in
his mind justify the decision arrived at.
It has long been recognized that the work of an appellate judge
is subject to certain environmental influences which are not subjective
and of which he may not be aware. It is not proposed to dwell
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upon these beyond mentioning some of the more readily recognized
ones-the legal professional training of judges, their independence
and security of tenure, the multiple-judge court, written or pronounced
reasons for judgment, pre-determined facts, adversary argument by
professional counsel-these and other factors go to make up the
atmosphere in which the work is carried on. These conditions are,
of course, not as casual as may appear; they have been, in the years
of development, brought about as part of the milieu experience has
shown to be conducive to the results the courts are designed to
achieve.
But what of the subjective factors? What do the members of
these courts conceive to be their function in the administration
of justice? The answer of any single person must be drawn from
his experience and observations: the views here expressed must be
taken with full recognition of the possibility, yea, the probability
that the experience and observation of others will lead them to
conclusions differing in many respects.
The aim of an appellate judge in approaching the decision of
any given case, is to do justice between the litigants, according to
law, at all times realizing that the decision will become part of the
body of law by which future causes will be decided. Each of these
three considerations has a compelling influence on the decision and
the reasons given as supporting the decision.
It is elementary, from the nature of the judicial office, that
justice as between the parties who have had recourse to the courts
must at all times be the aim of the court. It is the only purpose
for their existence and it is inconceivable that, where the rule of
law prevails, a judge would wittingly act unjustly.
But the justice to be dispensed is not moral justice according
to the personal philosophy of the judge: it must be legal justice
according to the laws which are binding on all citizens and a fortiori,
on all judges. Under the democratic system it falls to the legislature
to enact just laws and to the courts to interpret and apply the
laws as enacted: as of alternative interpretations of which the
written law is capable, a judge may apply his views of justice in
selecting which interpretation is to be applied-but a judge is not
free, in seeking to achieve his views as to justice, to apply an
interpretation of which the written text is not capable of meaning.
Justice in the eyes of the law must be the fulfillment of the law,
not its circumvention. Stability in the law which permits a citizen
to shape his course so as to be within the law demands that he
be not arbitrarily deprived of his rights by the failure of the court
to follow the law. Hence, in seeking the just result, it must be justice
as that is conceived to be in the law prevailing.
The fact that an appellate court is expected to give reasons for
its decision and that the reasons are from then on available to be
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cited as authority to be followed in later cases, points up the most
onerous responsibility that impresses itself on the members of the
court The realization that the views expressed in the case under
review will be projected into the future as part of the body of the
law brings home an appreciation of the obligation not only to
the litigants before the court but to all whose rights will be
governed by the law thereby laid down.
The awareness of the future impact of the present work leads
to a consciousness of two important principles:
(a) Stability in the application of the law demands adherence
to the settled law.
(b) The fulfilment of the common law requires that the immutable principles of the law be adapted to the requirements
of the evolving social, economic and political conditions
of the country.
The reconciliation of these two apparently irreconcilable precepts, while remaining a problem of magnitude, at the same time
serves to mark out the limits of variations within which the essential
work of the court must be done.
A further series of problems arises from the fact that not all
of the possible variations of fact have been the subject matter of
prior decisions, leaving, as it were, gaps presenting to the judge
an area of movement and requiring that the instant case be related
to one side or the other of the gap.
It is obvious that mere case-matching will not serve the purposes
of an appellate judge-if this were his highest function electronic
memories and computers would rapidly supersede the human element
and decisions would be produced with an assurance as to the identity
of the result with some earlier decision far greater than could be
expected of any human agency.
When one gets into the "gray" areas where, from lack of an
earlier decision exactly in point, or where the nature of the change in
human relationships makes inappropriate the authority to which the
situation is most nearly related, there are several steps by which a
solution can be reached or a proposed solution tested: these are not
necessarily successive steps but all of them at one time or another
direct the conclusion embodied in the reasons for judgment.
Just as a physician, after considering all the patient's symptoms
(subjective and objective) arrives at a diagnosis of the ailment by the
rejection of the non-relevant and the determination of the appropriate
weight to be given each significant factor, the judge's quest must be
to reduce the established facts to a recognizable situation to which
the applicable law can be related. Since the situation thus resolved is
associated with the social and economic atmosphere in which it arose,
it is' necessary that in examining the available precedents attention be
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directed to see that the precedent relied on was decided in the same
social and economic milieu or at least that the change which has
occurred in the background is of such little consequence that the
precedent has not become unsuitable.
This perhaps is but another phase of the procedure to be applied
in dealing with precedents. What is sought is not the near image
of the exact features: what is to be looked for and what is binding
is the underlying principle which the earlier court has applied 'to the
situation presented to it; the extension of the principle to a. similar
but not alike situation, is the essential skill in the handling of
precedent. And only when it is done in the true tradition of the common law is there faithful demonstration of the belief that the common
law can afford stability and at the same time adequately provide for
the cases for which there is no earlier exact parallel.
The process of extracting the principle upon which any decision
rests and the selection of the principles to be applied requires again
two separate considerations. A comparative examination of the
relevant cases should disclose not only the principle sought to be
isolated but the trend of judicial opinion which will give important
information as to the direction in which courts in the like matters
have been and are now facing and moving in the application of the
principle. When the direction of the trend has been discovered, the
judge must apply his personal judgment to the requirements of the
present social, economic and political atmosphere so that his conclusion will make sound sense, particularly with respect to the exact
distance he is prepared to go as of today in the direction which
future decisions will foreseeably go.
It is apparent that the judge will not be unaware of the element
of policy-that is both the desirable direction in which the law should
be moving and the extent to which the movement will be properly
carried by the case under review.1 The application of the decision to
hypothetical situations envisaged as occurring in the future will serve
as a test for the soundness of the rule applied and the usefulness of
its application.
Before concluding, a word as to draftmanship and its importance.
A well reasoned decision when made should provide for all time a
helpful exposition of some phase of law: by lack of care in its composition its value may be obscured and it may become a legacy of
difficulties.
The written reasons should be in tone authoritative but not
argumentive-they should be organized so as to present a logical
progression from the situation disclosed by the facts to the result
1
Canadian lawyers who survive the shock will find material for speculation in the doctrine of prospective over-ruling adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Great Northern By. v. Sunburst Oil, 287 U.S. 385, 85 A.LR. 254
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following irresistibly from the application of the appropriate law.
In other words, if they represent the process by which the author
has himself become convinced of the correctness of his decision, they
should lead the reader to the same conclusion. They should attempt
to resolve any apparent inconsistencies in the law as it stands and
provide a new starting point back of which it should not be necessary
to go in the future.
As a general rule, in scope they should not be more general than
is necessary for the decision of the actual point before the court. It
is the unnecessary comment and the obiter remarks that rise up to
haunt the writer and to confound courts called upon to deal with
similar but not like situations in the future.
Finally, the draft should be subjected to a two-fold scrutinythe first to examine the words used to discover whether they will
convey to the sophisticated reader the meaning intended-the second,
and by far the most important, to re-examine the same words to
determine if the text even in the hands of an ingenious counsel can
be read to mean anything other than that which it is intended to
mean.
It would be unfitting if this article had essayed at more than
expressing the writer's personal views-views which are open to the
criticism of being based on a limited experience in the production of
reasons for judgment. Other judges bring to the discharge of their
duties, experience more varied and more extensive. From the reading
of their judgments in the reports can be gathered the manner in
which they go about their work.
But for the readers who have not the time to make a study of
the reports, as well as to those engaged in writing the judgments on
them, it is heartening to know Llewellyn's conclusion after his extensive and intensive studies:
'Nor do I think any other craft of our law, taken as a whole and
taken in the light of what is offered the craftsmen to work with, is
coming as close to turning out a proper job as is our appellate bench."

